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Increasing the
Federal Cigarette Tax
Over the past several years, the political power of the
tobacco industry has been eroded by a series of developments. These include damning revelations of questionable marketing behavior, growing acceptance of the
deleterious effects of smoking (even on nonsmokers
exposed only to secondhand smoke), increasing understanding of the addictive nature of nicotine, declining
rates of smoking among adult men (historically, the
heaviest smoking population), and a growing consensus
that public health considerations should govern public
policy with regard to such issues as where people can
smoke and the access of minors to cigarettes and other
tobacco products. These developments culminated in the
$368.5 million settlement reached on June 20, 1997,
between the tobacco industry and 40 state attorneys
general who had brought suits against them.
But since that agreement was reached, inertia seems
to have overtaken action. Public health advocates,
harshly criticizing the legal protections afforded the
tobacco industry, have complained that the settlement
does not go far enough, and the industry has dug in its
heels over the issue of immunity from civil suits. Federal
officials have indicated that part of funds from the
settlement should accrue to the federal treasury, while
governors have argued that, because states have taken
the initiative and the risk, they should bear the full fruit
of their efforts. Lawyers representing the states have
attempted to lay claim to large pieces of the financial
award made under the settlement, much to the displeasure of most interested parties. Meanwhile, legislation
to implement the settlement has stagnated in Congress.
Even before the settlement was reached, however,
there was consensus on one point: it is time to increase
federal excise taxes on tobacco products. The magnitude of the increase remains open to debate. At a time
when talk of increased taxes generally seems to be the
kiss of death for politicians, the American public seems
reconciled to increased tobacco taxes. In part, this is
because they have long been inclined to accept “sin
taxes” like those on consumption of alcohol and tobacco products. In addition, both inflation and political
inertia have undercut the force of the federal cigarette
tax, which now stand at 24 cents per pack. Between
1951 and 1982, however, the federal tax stood at 8
cents per pack; just to accommodate inflation since
1951, the tax would now have to stand at 47 cents.

Moreover, U.S. tobacco taxes are lower than that of any
other developed nation.
In recent years, political leaders have repeatedly
turned to the tobacco tax as a means of financing health
policy initiatives. In 1994, President Clinton relied on
increased tobacco tax revenues as a means of financing
his proposed comprehensive national health insurance
program. Last year, in enacting the State Child Health
Insurance Program to cover uninsured indigent children,
congressional leaders zeroed in on an increase in
tobacco taxes as a means of underwriting the program in
the out years. And, while the settlement reached last
June 20 did not incorporate tax increases per se, it
would result in an estimated 62 cent increase per pack.
Subsequently, a number of bills have been introduced in
Congress building on the settlement by increasing taxes.
The focus of the public debate about tobacco tax
increases has shifted in recent months, partly as a result
of the growing public consensus on the desirability of
reducing tobacco consumption, especially among
children and young adults. Tobacco tax increases of
unprecedented magnitude—$1.50 per pack, or even
more—are on the table precisely because tax increases
are coming to be seen as a means of reducing consumption and deterring people—especially younger Americans—from beginning to smoke in the first place. Less
clear is how the increased revenues associated with
such an increase should be allocated—to programs to
reduce smoking, for reimbursing the costs of smokinginduced illnesses, for general health policy initiatives
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such as expanded insurance coverage, or even for
reducing the national debt.
This Forum session will probe the economic issues
associated with tobacco and cigarettes. In particular, it
will examine the possible effectiveness of a tax increase
as a strategy to reduce cigarette consumption, especially
among young people, and the likely ramifications of a
tax increase for the tobacco industry. As corollary
issues, the meeting will consider trends in cigarette and
tobacco consumption patterns as well as socioeconomic
and demographic differences in consumption. It will
also reference the dimensions of the tobacco industry,
including tobacco farming, manufacture of cigarettes
and other tobacco products, and wholesale and retail
sales of tobacco products, because such factors may
affect decisions about the scope of the settlement. The
session will also allow for discussion of the prospects for
congressional action on comprehensive tobacco legislation. It is recognized that, while economic or public
health criteria might point to a desired outcome, political
forces are likely to shape a quite different result.

THE JUNE 20 SETTLEMENT AND
SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS
When 40 state attorneys general and “Big Tobacco”
announced their $368.5 billion tobacco settlement on
June 20, 1997, it made both national and international
news. The agreement would end lawsuits brought by 40
states and Puerto Rico to recover Medicaid funds spent
on treating smoking-related illnesses. (Only two of the
top six tobacco-producing states, South Carolina and
Georgia, participated in the suit.1) The agreement would
also end class-action suits filed by 17 states on behalf of
smokers alleging harm from nicotine addiction. The
$368.5 billion would be paid over 25 years, with $10
billion up front and annual payments beginning at $8.5
billion in 1998, increasing to $15.5 billion by 2002 and
remaining stable thereafter. Of the total, $25 billion
would be earmarked to provide coverage to uninsured
children. Additional funds would go to anti-smoking
education campaigns, smoking cessation programs, and
enforcement of the legislation. Penalties would be incurred by tobacco companies if target reduction rates in
youth smoking were not reached. In return, the settlement would offer the tobacco industry certain protections; for example, it would limit future class-action
lawsuits and punitive damages for past tobacco industry
conduct. Individuals could still sue for damages.
Three months following the announcement of the
agreement, Clinton challenged Congress to strengthen

the settlement. Among other things, the president
suggested that the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) be vested with full authority to regulate tobacco
products and that tobacco farmers and their communities be protected from the potential negative consequences of the agreement.
Shortly after the president's challenge was issued,
three bills—one with bipartisan sponsorship, the other
two with sponsors from only one party—were introduced to build on the June 20 settlement. They addressed issues such as protections for tobacco farmers,
the dollar level of the settlement, FDA authority to
regulate tobacco, liability protections for the tobacco
industry, and increased federal cigarette taxes. None has
left committee since introduction.
In mid-February, Clinton threw his support behind
a fourth bill, developed by a Senate Democratic Task
Force on Tobacco headed by Sen. Kent Conrad (DN.D.), that would raise the cigarette tax $1.50 per pack
but would give the tobacco industry more limited protection from lawsuits than the settlement.2 The bill
would settle only those suits brought by government entities, such as those initiated by the 40 state attorneys
general; unlike the settlement, it would allow class
action suits. The Conrad bill would also expand the
FDA’s authority and penalize the industry more strongly for failure to meet targets to reduce youth smoking.

FACTORS INFLUENCING
THE SETTLEMENT
For decades, public health officials and advocates
have asserted that cigarettes cause cancer and heart
disease, that nicotine is addictive, and that cigarette
smoking is the number one preventable cause of morbidity and mortality. Until very recently, the tobacco
industry responded that the causal relationship between
tobacco and disease had not been proven conclusively,
that nicotine was not addictive, and that smoking was a
matter of free choice by individual Americans.
In early 1994, then-Commissioner David Kessler
announced plans for the FDA to consider regulating
tobacco as a drug. Following this, seven tobacco
company executives testified before Congress that
smoking was not addictive. Soon thereafter, thousands
of internal industry documents became public that
suggested that the industry had been manipulating the
nicotine content in cigarettes for decades. With mounting evidence of the health hazards of cigarettes, in 1994
Michael Moore of Mississippi became the first state
attorney general to sue tobacco companies to recover
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health care costs associated with smoking. Other states’
suits followed, eventually totaling 40.
While states were battling the tobacco industry, the
FDA received a strongly worded letter from a group of
members of Congress from tobacco-growing states,
claiming that the agency’s tobacco proposal would put
thousands of jobs at risk and “trample First Amendment
rights to advertise legal products to adults.” Nevertheless, the FDA in 1995 declared that nicotine was a drug.
In late summer of 1996, the president supported the
FDA’s proposed regulation, allowing the agency to
regulate cigarettes as a “drug delivery device.” This was
followed by an admission by Liggett Tobacco in early
1997 that smoking was addictive and could cause
cancer. Not long after that, attorney generals from 40
states and the tobacco industry came to the landmark
June 20 settlement.

Cigarette Consumption
To understand the ramifications of the settlement
and any tax increase, it is important to examine patterns
of cigarette consumption. Cigarette consumption has
been a focus of public policy since 1964, when the U.S.
surgeon general first indicated a causal link between
cigarette smoking and lung cancer among men.3
Twenty-four surgeon generals’ reports later—each
cautioning the public of the dangers of smoking—
cigarette smoking remains the primary preventable
cause of morbidity and mortality in the United States.
Over 400,000 individuals die prematurely of smokingrelated illnesses each year.4 Following decades of
public information on the adverse consequences of
smoking, the number of adult smokers in America
declined from 51 million Americans in 1988 to 47
million Americans in 1995, the most recent year a
national survey was conducted on smoking prevalence.5
Approximately 25 percent of all Americans aged 18
years and older are “current smokers,” defined as
individuals who report having smoked more than 100
cigarettes during their lifetime and who now consume
cigarettes on at least some days. Although the percentage of male smokers is still higher than that of female
smokers—27 percent versus 22 percent—this gap is
narrowing. Until relatively recently, men had much
higher rates of smoking, but a number of factors,
including greater freedom from traditional social
constraints for women and targeted cigarette advertising, have increased the rates for women. The state of
Kentucky has the highest percentage of adult smokers
(28 percent) and Utah has the lowest (13 percent).6 The
median state rate is 22 percent.

The percentage of adult smokers varies considerably
across ethnic and racial groups:
American Indians/Alaskan Natives
White (non-Hispanic)
Black (non-Hispanic)
Hispanic
Asian/Pacific Islander

36 percent
26 percent
26 percent
18 percent
17 percent

Even more pronounced in accounting for differences
in smoking are socioeconomic status and education
levels. Studies have shown that a higher percentage of
poor people smoke. According to a recent survey, those
living below poverty level between the years 1991 and
1993 were 26 percent to 30 percent more likely to be
smokers than those living above the poverty threshold.7
Individuals with lower levels of education (9 to 11
years) had the highest rates of smoking (38 percent),
while those with more than 16 years of education had
the lowest rates of smoking (14 percent).
Although the overall rates of smoking among adults
have steadily declined (by an annual average rate of 1.3
percent since 1990),8 the number of young adults
picking up the habit has increased. According to the
National Monitoring the Future Study, cigarette smoking has continued to increase among high school seniors.9 In 1997, 25 percent of 12th graders reported daily
cigarette smoking, the highest rate since 1979. On the
brighter side, the percentage of eighth and tenth graders
engaging in smoking has declined slightly, the first time
this has occurred since the data were collected.
Cigarette smoking remains the preferred mode of
tobacco consumption in America. In 1996, Americans
smoked 487 billion cigarettes.10 Per capita cigarette
consumption was 2,490; the record high was 4,345 in
1963. Americans also consumed 3 billion cigars, 14
million pounds of pipe tobacco, 60 million pounds of
chewing tobacco, and 60 million pounds of snuff.
The average price of a pack of 20 cigarettes for a
full-priced brand (including federal and state taxes) is
$1.96. (For a pack of generic brand cigarettes, it is
$1.85.) State-specific average cigarette prices range
from $1.56 in Kentucky to $2.75 in Washington state;
the variation is attributable to differentials in state
cigarette taxes.
The price of a pack of 20 cigarettes in the United
States is one of the lowest among developed countries.
The Non-Smoker’s Rights Association, based in
Ottawa, Canada, conducted a survey of the price of 20
cigarettes in selected countries in 1995.11 The price in
the United States was $1.89; in Norway, which had the
highest price, it was $5.43 (in U.S. dollars), followed by
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Denmark ($5.03), Ireland ($4.33), and the United
Kingdom ($4.28).
In 1996, Americans spent a total of $45 billion for
cigarette products. Of the total, approximately $13
billion went to federal and state taxes, which accounted
for 30 percent of the retail price of cigarettes. The U.S.
tax rate remains the lowest excise tax on cigarette
products in developed countries. In a large number of
countries, the average tax rate ranges from 60 percent
to 80 percent of the price of a pack of cigarettes.12

The Tobacco Industry13
While a primary public health goal has been to
reduce overall rates of cigarette consumption, the
tobacco industry has long been a staple of the U.S.
economy, with particular importance in the Southeast.
In a study produced for the Tobacco Institute, the
American Economic Group (AEG) estimated that the
tobacco industry contributed $44.7 billion to the United
States Gross National Product (GNP) in 1994 (about
0.6 percent of total GNP for that year). The tobacco
industry directly supported 662,402 jobs that produced
and delivered tobacco products.
Five American corporations—Philip Morris, Inc.; R.
J. Reynolds Tobacco Companies; Brown and Williams
Tobacco Corporation (B.A.T. Industries); Lorrillard,
Inc. (Loews); and Liggett Group, Inc.—manufacture
cigarettes, and two, Philip Morris and R. J. Reynolds,
account for more than 70 percent of all industry sales.
The total output of cigarettes from U.S. factories in
1996 was 760 billion. Of this figure, 10 billion were
shipped to American armed forces overseas and 260
billion were shipped to other countries.
Tobacco is the seventh largest cash crop; it was
valued at $2.9 billion in 1996, comprising approximately 2.5 percent of the total value of cash crops and
farm commodities in the United States. Tobacco is
grown in 21 states and Puerto Rico, with six states
accounting for more than 90 percent of annual farm
cash receipts from tobacco. These top tobacco-producing states (ranked from first to sixth) are North Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, South Carolina, Georgia, and
Virginia. In 1994, North Carolina alone accounted for
almost 36 percent of the value of tobacco leaf grown in
the United States. (Tobacco manufacturing is even
more concentrated in that state; it was the source of
about 54 percent of the total U.S. tobacco manufacturing and product value in 1992.)
Tobacco was grown on 124,270 farms in the United
States in 1996. Approximately 739,000 acres were

harvested, yielding a total harvest of 1.54 billion pounds
of leaves. Although tobacco is the most labor-intensive
crop to grow (tobacco leaves are handpicked individually), tobacco yielded more gross revenue per acre
($4,089) than other crops such as wheat ($140), corn
($278), or peanuts ($755). At $1,627 per acre, sweet
potatoes came closest to the farm value of tobacco.14
The federal government issued 346,000 tobacco
allotments in 1996. Tobacco allotments, or quotas, form
the basis of a price support program that was established in the early 1930s under the Agricultural Adjustment Act. Essentially, the program limits the tobacco
supply but guarantees growers a minimum price for
their crops. Only allotment holders—growers who own
or lease allotments of land—are eligible to participate
in the program. Within a given allotment, a quota is set,
which limits the amount of tobacco that can be produced. Until 1982, the federal government helped
subsidize the program; however, in that year Congress
passed legislation stipulating that the price support
system be run at “no net costs to the taxpayers,” other
than for administrative purposes. The administrative
costs for the program were $15 million in 1995.15
Despite the seemingly nominal costs to the federal
government to support the program (compared to price
support programs for other crops), critics of the program
argue that it seems inconsistent as a matter of public
policy to support tobacco farmers while at the same time
campaigning for a reduction in smoking. When House
Appropriations Committee member Nita Lowey (D-NY)
introduced legislation that would end the federal subsidies for tobacco farmers for fiscal year (FY) 1998, this
measure was defeated by members of tobacco-growing
states who claimed that it would hurt farmers but do
little to reduce overall cigarette consumption.
In 1992, according to estimates from the Business
Division of U.S. Bureau of Census, 625,000 retail
outlets distributed tobacco products. Approximately
3,600 retail tobacco shops were in business in 1996; of
these, 1,020 specialized primarily in cigarette products.
Cigarette sales at more than half of these retail shops
averaged $500,000 or more. Cigarette products were
also sold in convenience stores and gas stations. Total
tobacco sales in these stores were $12.7 billion. Vending machine sales added $2 billion in tobacco sales.

CIGARETTE TAX LEVELS
The federal government has imposed excise taxes on
tobacco products since 1890. State tobacco taxation did
not begin until 1921, when Iowa became the first state
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to add its own cigarette tax of $0.02 per pack onto the
federal excise levy tax of $0.06 per pack. By 1970, all
50 states and the District of Columbia imposed state
cigarette taxes in addition to the federal excise tax.
Municipalities in eight states also impose taxes on
cigarette products. The federal excise tax on a pack of
cigarettes is currently $0.24.16 State cigarette taxes
range from a low of $0.025 in Virginia to a high of
$1.00 in Alaska (and Hawaii, too, effective July 1,
1998). The average state tax is $0.385.
Although cigarette products have long been subject
to federal taxation, trends in the level of federal taxes are
noteworthy. The federal tax increased slowly from 1
cent per pack to 8 cents per pack between 1890 and
1951, remaining at that level for the next three decades.
The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
boosted the tax on a pack of cigarettes to 16 cents per
pack. In 1991, the federal excise tax rose to 20 cents per
pack, reaching 24 cents per pack by 1993. As mentioned
above, if the tax had been adjusted for inflation since
1951, the federal excise tax would now be 47 cents
instead of 24 cents per pack.17 This has led some to
suggest the merits of indexing cigarette taxes to accommodate inflation (for example, by adjusting the taxes for
changes in the Consumer Price Index or setting them at
a specified percentage of the average price per pack.)
Federal excise taxes on cigarettes have served a
variety of purposes. In 1898, cigarette taxes were hiked
by 200 percent to help finance the Spanish-American
War. More recently, the abortive 1994 Clinton Health
Security Act included a tobacco tax increase to help pay
for health care reform. Last year, the State Child Health
Insurance Program to expand health insurance to uninsured children—enacted as part of the Balanced Budget
Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-33)—contained provisions for
funding based on an increase of 10 cents in the cigarette
tax beginning in FY 2000 and 15 cents beginning in FY
2002. In the president’s proposed FY 1999 budget, the
projected $14.8 billion increase in tobacco revenues
(predicated on the passage of tobacco-settlement-related
legislation and expected to total $65.5 billion over five
years) would help pay for child care programs, education, health insurance, and medical research. The
revenues would also go towards reducing the federal
deficit. Some Republican senators have responded that
any enhanced revenues derived from the settlement
should be spent only for health-related purposes.
Increases in cigarette taxes have also been used as an
opportunity by the tobacco industry to raise cigarette
prices. This behavior by the industry was documented in
a September 1997 Federal Trade Commission (FTC)

report entitled Competition and the Financial Impact of
the Proposed Tobacco Industry Settlement.18 The report
found historical evidence that, with each tax increase,
the cigarette industry “passed through” the tax increase
to consumers by increasing the price of cigarettes and
raised the price by more than the amount of the tax
increase. The FTC report highlighted several studies that
found that, between 1955 and 1990, the pass-through
rates from federal taxes to retail prices were estimated at
102 percent. Another study found that between 1980 and
1992, the average prices for cigarettes rose faster than
the combined total costs of cigarette manufacturing and
federal taxes. Other studies found that the tobacco
industry engaged in similar behavior with respect to
increases in state and municipal taxes, raising prices by
passing tax increases through to consumers. The FTC
report also concluded that the tobacco industry would
profit substantially from the June settlement (if legislation is enacted to ratify the settlement), since it would
grant tobacco companies antitrust immunity for achieving the goals of the settlement, primarily a reduction in
youth smoking. In addition, the FTC found that the
settlement would provide an opportunity for the industry
to “coordinate” price increases and generate substantial
profits. In response to the FTC report, the tobacco
companies (with the exception of Brown and Williamson) criticized the report as “seriously flawed” and cited
a series of underlying methodological errors.19

The Demand for Cigarettes
To discuss the effects of tax increases on cigarette
consumption, economists often use the term “price
elasticity of demand” to indicate the effect of a change
in the price of a product on the demand for the product
(cigarettes). For example, if a product has a price
elasticity of demand of -2.0, an increase in the price of
the product by 10 percent would result in a decrease in
demand for the product by 20 percent. The generally
accepted estimate of the price elasticity of demand for
cigarettes in the United States is -0.4.20 This implies that
a 10 percent price increase will result in a 4 percent
decrease in the number of cigarettes demanded. These
estimates are based on historical data on the demand for
cigarettes. Some studies have shown that the overall demand by adults for cigarettes is price inelastic, or
relatively insensitive to price. This implies that adult
consumers will continue to smoke despite increases in
cigarette prices. (As discussed below, however, the
price responsiveness of demand for cigarettes among
underage smokers is much stronger, making tax increases a tool with great potential for reducing underage
smoking.)
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Recently, economists have been asked to predict the
price elasticity of demand for cigarettes in light of the
discussions about the settlement-induced price increase
(estimated to be 62 cents) and proposals for increased
federal taxes. At the request of the Senate Democratic
Task Force on Tobacco, the industry was asked to
estimate the impact of the settlement on cigarette
consumption.21 The tobacco industry analysis released
in October 1997 concluded that cigarette consumption
would decline by up to 43 percent in the next decade if
the tax increase included in the settlement were implemented. This analysis was based on the assumption that
the price elasticity of demand for cigarettes would range
between -0.5 and -0.75, significantly higher than the
-0.4 figure cited above. According to the analysis,
When consumer prices reach unprecedented levels,
sensitivity to price also rises and thus elasticity ratios
become more pronounced. . . . The industry conservatively estimates that as a result of the real retail price
increases that will result from the implementation of
the proposed resolution [the settlement], price elasticity is likely to range between -0.5 and -0.75.

In other words, the higher the rate of tax increase, the
more precipitous would be the decline in demand.
Numerous studies have demonstrated that young
people are especially sensitive to price. Michael Grossman, professor of economics at the City University of
New York, and Frank Chaloupka, associate professor
of economics at the University of Illinois at Chicago,
concluded that a 10 percent increase in the price of
cigarettes would lower the number of youth smokers by
7 percent.22 Based on similar studies, youths are estimated to be up to three times more sensitive to price
increases than adults.
Grossman and Chaloupka offer three reasons for
teenagers’ greater responsiveness to the price of
cigarettes. First, young smokers have less disposable
income than adults do. Second, the effects of peer
pressure are much more pronounced among young
smokers. Third, young people have a greater tendency
to discount the future. Since teenagers are more likely
to give more weight to present satisfaction and very
little weight to future consequences of their actions,
they may opt to smoke to satisfy their curiosity.

Likely Effects of Tax or Price Increases on
Consumption
How much federal taxes on cigarettes might or
should be increased is a matter of debate. The alternative tax and price increase scenarios currently under
discussion might have the following results based on an

overall price elasticity of demand of -0.4, the current
consensus rate; an elasticity of two to three times that
rate for younger smokers; and an assumption that the
increase will be maintained in real value over time:23







62 cents—If the June agreement were adopted
without change and resulted in a price increase of 62
cents per pack, total consumption would decline
about 10 percent. Youth consumption would decline
by one-fifth to one-third. The smoking initiation rate
for regular smokers aged 18 to 24 is projected to fall
from its 1995 rate of 25 percent to about 20 percent.
$1.50—If taxes were increased by $1.50 per pack—
as Clinton and some Democratic senators have suggested—total consumption would drop by about 15
to 20 percent, and youth consumption would fall by
between 33 percent and 50 percent.
$2.00—If taxes were increased by $2.00 per pack—
as some public health experts have suggested—total
consumption would drop by about 25 percent. Youth
consumption would fall by between 55 percent and
80 percent. The initiation rate for regular smokers
between 18 and 24 years of age would fall from 25
percent to 12 percent or less.

In mid-February, the Clinton administration announced results of a Treasury Department study that
found that an increase in cigarette taxes of $1.10 per
pack would result in a 32 percent decline in youth
consumption. (This finding was based on the assumption
—also made by Grossman and Chaloupka—that, for
every 10 percent increase in price, there would be a 7
percent decline in smoking by young Americans.)
Adding in the effects of marketing and advertising
restrictions supported by the administration, the Treasury Department projected an overall decline of 39 to 46
percent in youth consumption, reducing the number of
teenage smokers by between 2.4 and 2.8 million cumulatively over the next five years.
While Congress and the president will have the final
say on any tobacco settlement and on any federal
cigarette tax increase, analysts predict that a federal tax
increase would most likely be no more than the $1.50
figure proposed by the president and some Democratic
senators.
Although no federal tobacco legislation has passed in
recent months, the tobacco industry itself has continued
to increase the price of cigarettes, raising it at least three
times in the last 12 months. In March 1997, a price
increase of $0.05 per pack became effective, one month
following the settlement reached between the state of
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Florida and the tobacco industry. This was followed by
a $0.07 per pack increase in September 1997; the same
month, Clinton unveiled his proposal for a $1.50 tax
increase. In January 1998, the tobacco industry raised
the price of cigarettes $0.025 per pack of cigarettes, one
day after the Texas settlement was announced. Coincidentally, each price increase followed (and was possibly
camouflaged by) events that occurred as a result of
developments related to government tobacco policy.

CIGARETTE TAX INCREASES AS A
STRATEGY TO REDUCE UNDERAGE
CONSUMPTION
Because nicotine is addictive, underage cigarette
smoking can have negative lifelong health consequences and, ultimately, result in premature death. A
principal goal for public health advocates and policymakers, therefore, has been to reduce the consumption
of cigarettes by youths. Numerous studies have shown
that more than 90 percent of current smokers begin the
habit before they reach 18 years of age. Each day,
approximately 3,000 youths become daily cigarette
smokers. This translates to more than one million new
smokers annually. Grossman and Chaloupka state that
although “taxing cigarettes to reduce smoking by
teenagers is a rather blunt instrument because it imposes costs on other smokers . . . an excise tax is a very
effective policy with regard to teenagers because they
are so sensitive to price.”
While a primary goal in the tobacco public policy
debate is to reduce the consumption of tobacco among
young people, critics contend that any tax increase is
regressive in nature, since it would disproportionately
affect individuals who could least afford increased
prices. According to Kip Viscusi, professor of law and
economics at the Harvard Law School, “Cigarette taxes
are regressive not only in terms of the percentage of
income going toward the tax, but also in absolute
terms.”24 Individuals in lower-income groups pay more
in terms of total dollars of cigarette taxes than the more
affluent. Viscusi concluded that since cigarette smokers
tend to be poorer and are more likely to be blue-collar
workers, the higher prices would impose substantial
costs on people who can least afford it. “If Congress
passes this proposed resolution [the settlement], the
maintenance workers at the Capitol will pay more of
the taxes than the members of Congress who voted for
the legislation,” Viscusi commented. To offset the
regressive nature of the tax, some public health advocates suggest that the revenues generated by the tax

could be used to support measures targeted to lowincome groups, such as smoking cessation programs or
health education programs.
In addition, opponents of tax increases cite Canada as
an example where an increase in taxes created a large
black market for cigarettes. To curb smoking prevalence, Canadian officials raised taxes on cigarettes
significantly during the 1980s and 1990s. By 1994, the
price of a pack of cigarettes in Canada had risen (in U.S.
dollars) to $5.26—and a carton of cigarettes ranged from
$44.00 to $57.00, one of the highest prices for cigarettes
in developed countries. In comparison, the cost of a
carton of cigarettes averaged $17.00 in the United
States. The price disparity between the two countries led
to smuggling of cigarettes from the United States to
Canada and a loss of more than $2 billion (in Canadian
dollars) in tax revenues for Canada.25 According to
Canadian officials, efforts to reduce cigarette smoking
through increased taxes were negated by the large-scale
smuggling problem. Consequently, Canada reduced the
tax on cigarettes later that year. Proponents of federal
tax increases contend that once a federal tax increase is
realized in the United States, Canada is likely to increase
its cigarette taxes as well.
It has been suggested that Mexico may pose a more
serious threat of cigarette smuggling, partly because
some amount of smuggling is already taking place across
the southern U.S. border. A black market for cigarettes
may arise if a large price disparity develops between
Mexico and the United States. Practically speaking,
though, given the bulkiness of cigarette cartons and the
relatively low return that cigarettes would yield even on
a black market, smuggling of cigarettes would not be as
easily masked or as profitable as smuggling illegal drugs,
such as cocaine and heroin. Proponents of increased
federal taxes contend that smuggling from Mexico would
not generate significant profits and might thus be a selflimiting phenomenon.
Another argument against any increase in taxes is the
already-existing decline in cigarette sales, even at the
current tax rates. In addition, any tax increase is to some
degree politically unpopular—although some recent
surveys indicate a greater public tolerance for increased
taxes on cigarettes in comparison to taxes on other
items. Furthermore, any tax increase will affect tobacco
farmers in the Southeast whose incomes are tied directly
to tobacco. According to a congressional staffer from a
tobacco state, “Tobacco has paid the bill and has provided the opportunities to do other things.” The staffer
went on to say:
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Farmers do have other crops and livestock, but it is
tobacco that makes the money and pays the bills.
Taxes are not the answers to curb youth access to
cigarettes or to underage smoking. Something needs
to be done about youth access, but not at the expense
of tobacco farmers, who are older than the national
average.

Thomas Schelling, professor of economics at the
University of Maryland, wrote in a 1986 paper, however:
If farming does become less rewarding . . . we can
expect a continuation of a phenomenon that has been
going on for the last 100 years, namely, gradual
reduction in the farming population and growth of the
population in other industries.26

Despite the possible adverse impact of a reduction in
cigarette consumption to farmers, Schelling cautioned:
We should keep in mind that the number of people
who earn most of their living from growing tobacco
is smaller than the number of smokers who are
estimated to die annually as a result of the tobacco
they smoke. One premature death per year is a high
social cost for keeping a tobacco farmer’s children
from having to shift to another crop or another
occupation.

While any strategy to reduce tobacco consumption
may result in lower tobacco sales, employment, and
revenues for small businesses, Kenneth Warner and his
colleagues have suggested that, contrary to tobacco
supporters’ claims, reductions in spending and manufacturing of tobacco products would not have a dramatically negative impact on the U.S. economy. In 1996,
they examined whether declines in tobacco product
sales would significantly reduce employment in the
United States.27 Using a computer simulation of the
economies of the Southeast tobacco region and eight
nontobacco regions in the United States, the number of
jobs was projected, given a reduction in tobacco
expenditures. The authors found that, while a reduction
in tobacco spending would reduce the number of jobs
in the Southeast region, it would increase employment
in nontobacco regions. They concluded:
The amount of economic activity would not disappear; rather, it would be redistributed as consumers,
having no less income, would use the same money to
purchase other goods and services. Just like spending
on tobacco, this alternative spending would generate
employment associated with production, distribution,
and sale of purchased goods and services.

Nevertheless, tax increases alone—at least at politically feasible levels—may not achieve a desired level of
smoking reduction. During a hearing by the House
Commerce Subcommittee on Health and Environment

held in December 1997, Leonard Jason, professor of
psychology at DePaul University, testified “The best
approach (towards reducing cigarette consumption) is a
combination of tools, including restricting access and
advertising, school-based programs, and price increases.”

THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF
SMOKING REDUCTION
A major consideration in evaluating costs associated
with reduced smoking is the amount that government
has spent on smoking-related diseases. When negotiations that led to the settlement were under way, a major
goal for the 40 state attorneys general was to recover
Medicaid funds spent on treating smoking-related
illnesses.28 The Office on Smoking and Health in the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimated
smoking-attributable costs for medical care to be $50
billion annually in 1993.29 This cost includes prescription drugs, hospitalization, physician care, and nursing
home care. If indirect costs—such as costs associated
with reduced worker productivity because of cigaretteinduced illnesses—were included, total smoking-attributable costs would double.
The healthcare costs associated with cigarette smoking have been extensively studied, but with inconclusive
results. On the one hand, the added medical care required by smokers for smoking-induced illnesses means
that smokers accrue greater medical expenses while they
are alive. On the other hand, some studies have demonstrated that if people stopped smoking, savings in
healthcare costs would result, but only in the short
term.30 Eventually, smoking cessation would lead to
greater public and private outlays for former smokers, as
mortality among smokers declined and their average life
spans increased, leading to greater total costs for medical care as well as for pensions and Social Security.
Yet, as Thomas Schelling notes, the “idea that people
who smoke and die 15 years early are net financial
benefactors to the rest of society by living most of a
normal tax-paying life and dying before they can claim
their retirement benefit is somewhat paradoxical.”
Moreover, the argument seems at odds with a basic
objective of American medicine—to prolong life.

THE FORUM SESSION
This Forum meeting will focus on the potential effects
of cigarette price and/or tax increases on consumption. In
addition, it will briefly review the economics of tobacco,
including the extent of current demand for tobacco
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products (principally cigarettes) and the price responsiveness of that demand; the size and importance of the
tobacco industry, both nationally and regionally; and
federal, state, and local tax policy with respect to
cigarettes. Particular attention will be given to the merits
of increased taxes as a means to reduce cigarette consumption, especially among younger Americans.
Among the questions to be considered are:










How might a federal tax increase be used as one of
several weapons to reduce underage smoking?
What other options will promote the goal of reducing underage smoking?
How large would a federal tax increase have to be
to yield an appreciable reduction in smoking? Are
taxes at this level politically feasible, insofar as they
reduce demand for tobacco and tobacco products,
which will have a disproportionate impact on the
Southeast?
Would tax or price increases of a high level yield a
disproportionate decrease in consumption? That is,
is price elasticity of demand for cigarettes arithmetic
(straight line) or geometric (curved line) past a
certain level?
Is it desirable to index tobacco tax rates to assure
that their deterrent effect is not undermined by
inflation?
How should the revenues from any increase in
federal tobacco taxes be allocated? How are concerns about the use of the revenues likely to influence the amount of the tax increase? Is the goal to
reduce tobacco consumption and prevent nicotine
addiction or to pay for the costs of tobacco-induced
illnesses? Might the revenues be used to help
tobacco farmers make the transition to other crops
and manufacturers retool to produce other products?
Or should they be used for other unrelated purposes,
such as reducing the national debt or funding
unrelated public programs?

health promotion, with special emphasis on smoking and
health. Dr. Warner is also associate director of the
University’s Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Clinical
Scholars Program. He was awarded the Surgeon General’s Medallion by Dr. C. Everett Koop in 1989, and
served as senior scientific editor for the 25th anniversary
surgeon general’s report in the same year. He holds a
Ph.D. in economics from Yale.
Next, Stephen Entin, executive director and chief
economist of the Institute for Research on the Economics of Taxation, a pro-free market economic policy
research organization, will offer a critique of current and
proposed federal tobacco excise tax policy. A former
deputy assistant secretary for economic policy at the
Department of the Treasury, Mr. Entin joined the
agency with the incoming Reagan administration in
1981. He participated in the preparation of economic
forecasts for the president’s budgets and the development of the 1981 tax cuts. Prior to joining Treasury, he
was a staff economist with the Joint Economic Committee of Congress, where he developed legislation for tax
rate reduction and incentives to encourage savings. Mr.
Entin received his graduate economics training at the
University of Chicago.
Finally, Thomas Schelling, professor of economics
and public affairs at the University of Maryland, will
respond to the presentations of both previous speakers
and place them in the broader context of economic
policy. Dr. Schelling also holds the position of professor
of political economy emeritus at Harvard University,
where he taught from 1958 to 1990. From 1983 to 1989,
he served as director of Harvard’s Institute for the Study
of Smoking Behavior and Policy and, from 1976 to
1982, was a member of the National Academy of
Sciences Committee on Substance Abuse and Habitual
Behavior. Before going to Harvard, Dr. Schelling taught
economics at Yale and served in various capacities in
the Truman administration. He has published extensively
on a broad range of topics, including military strategy
and arms control, energy and environmental policy, and
tobacco and drug policy.

Speakers
Kenneth Warner, Ph.D., professor of public health
at the University of Michigan, will lead off by reviewing research on the price responsiveness of demand for
tobacco, recent developments in tobacco tax policy,
and the merits of a tobacco tax increase as a means of
reducing smoking, especially among younger Americans. On the School of Public Health faculty since
1972, Dr. Warner has published extensively on economic and policy aspects of disease prevention and
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